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Abstract 
Conceived in 2003 and 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has now had two 
years of operational experience. This initial experience has seen a sorting out of the partner 
states, with Action Plans drawn up for five Eastern and seven Southern partner states. We 
would distinguish among these 12 states between the ‘willing’ and the ‘passive’; and among 
the other partner states without Action Plans between the ‘reluctant’ and the ‘excluded’. These 
groupings should be the basis for stronger differentiation in the policy packages offered by the 
EU. In general the political context now calls for a strong reinforcement of the ENP, since the 
benign situation of 2004 has given way now to a more menacing one, given threats to 
European values bearing down on the EU from all sides. The EU institutions recognise these 
needs in principle, and last December the Commission advanced many valuable proposals. 
‘ENP plus’ is a term being used by the current German Presidency, without this yet being 
defined in a public document in operational detail. In our view, ‘ENP plus’ could mean: 
o  Plus an advanced association model for the able and willing partner states, 
o  Plus a strengthening of regional-multilateral schemes, 
o  Plus an upgrading of the standard instruments being deployed, and 
o  Plus the offer of an ‘ENP light’ model for difficult states or non-recognised entities. 
More precisely we suggest a 15-point programme for achieving a qualitative upgrading of the 
ENP, to give it strategic leverage, rather than allowing it to be seen as a poor cousin of the 
enlargement process.  
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European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years on: 
Time indeed for an ‘ENP plus’ 
MICHAEL EMERSON, GERGANA NOUTCHEVA AND NICU POPESCU 
CEPS Policy Brief No. 126/March 2007 
1. Summary  &  Conclusions 
After two years, calls for an ‘ENP plus’ 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), conceived in 2003
1 and 2004
2, has now had two 
years of operational experience in 2005 and 2006. After these two years of operations, the 
Commission and the Council agree that the ENP needs to be strengthened, hence the current 
discussion around the idea of an ‘ENP plus’.  
‘ENP plus’ is a term being used by the current German Presidency.
3 For its part, the 
Commission made comprehensive proposals in December 2006, which contain a rich agenda for 
strengthening the ENP.
4 There are many questions about turning these proposals into practice, 
and in some respects we would want to go further. The general direction is positive, however, 
and could enable the ENP to move into a qualitatively higher gear.  
Concretely, we identify a 15-point programme for an upgraded ENP to give it strategic leverage, 
rather than be perceived as a poor cousin of the enlargement process. These points combine 
things that the EU is doing, is proposing to do or should be proposing to do.  
A sorting of the partner states 
The initial experience of the ENP has seen a sorting out of the partner states, with Action Plans 
drawn up for five Eastern and seven Southern partner states. A majority of these states are 
actually looking to the EU for more strategic content than has so far been provided by the ENP.  
However, among the Action Plan states, we would distinguish between the ‘willing’ and the 
‘passive’. Among those without Action Plans we would distinguish between the ‘reluctant’ and 
the ‘excluded’.  
These groupings could serve as the basis for a stronger differentiation in the policy packages 
offered by the EU, and for stronger incentives for partner states to advance up this hierarchy.  
The present report identifies the areas or measures that could be the source of potential ‘pluses’. 
These are now summarised, followed by a structuring of them according to categories of partner 
states and regions. 
                                                      
1 European Commission, Communication on Wider Europe: A New Framework for Relations with our 
Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003)104 final, 11 March 2003.   
2 European Commission, Communication on European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper, 
COM(2004)373 final, 12 May 2004.  
3 The most detailed public account of German ideas appears in Franz-Walter-Steinmeier, “Interaction and 
Integration – A new phase of Ostpolitik: globalisation demands interaction, not isolationism”, 
Internationale Politik, Spring 2007, DGAP, Berlin. 
4 European Commission, Communication on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
COM(2006)726 final, 4 December 2006. These proposals will presumably be the basis for discussions at 
an informal meeting of EU Foreign Ministers scheduled for the end of March 2007, with the Council 
Presidency due to draw conclusions in June. 2 | EMERSON, NOUTCHEVA & POPESCU 
 
1.1  Sources of potential ‘pluses’ – A 15-point programme 
The bilateral-regional-multilateral balance 
The bringing together of East and South in a single ENP initially saw anomalies: to the East the 
ENP has been so far entirely bilateral, whereas the 10-year old Barcelona process has been 
largely multilateral. A better synthesis seems now to emerge, however, with the ENP having 
added a sorely lacking bilateral dimension for the South, and with multilateral initiatives now 
developing for the East (Black Sea, energy and transport networks). In the trade area, a strategic 
multilateral dimension for East and South together can be envisaged (see further below). 
Advanced association (or otherwise named) agreements 
The Commission could well outline now a general model for an advanced association 
agreement for the partner states willing and able to achieve high levels of political convergence 
and economic integration with the EU. This begins to be done in the particular case of Ukraine, 
with which negotiations have now been launched for an ‘enhanced agreement’ (name for 
reconsideration). This could establish a template for a new model agreement with 
comprehensive and deep content (all 3 ‘pillars’ of EU competences) and institutional association 
arrangements.  
Institutional connections 
The Commission opened up the subject of possible participation in agencies and programmes of 
the EU in a comprehensive paper that the Council largely approved on 5 March. This is a 
positive move, to be followed up carefully with the most advanced partner states, i.e. to identify 
useful and feasible cases without flooding the agencies and programmes with new participants. 
The range of possibilities could be further extended in the most privileged cases with observer 
status in the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee.  
The membership perspective question 
The treaties say that any European democracy can apply for membership, which means an ‘open 
door’ principle for European partner states. This is not in contradiction with the obvious need 
for the EU’s institutional system to be adapted adequately to make continuing enlargement 
feasible in the long run. 
Democracy promotion 
The subject of democracy promotion only features in the Action Plans where the leaderships of 
the partner states like the idea, as mainly among Eastern partners. In the South their interest has 
tended to be limited to rather technical governance issues, or to certain sectors such as judiciary 
reform. Contrary to the EU’s intentions, consultations over the Action Plans with political 
parties and civil society actors have been thin so far, especially in the South. Ways need to be 
found to extend the engagement over Action Plans with all democratic parties, including in the 
South with ‘Muslim democrat’ parties.  
Deep free trade – bilateral 
The idea of ‘deep free trade’ as flagship of the economics of the ENP is positive, but the 
Commission needs to do far more work to define this in operational terms. The Commission 
could usefully produce a ‘Deep Free Trade Handbook’ to guide technical assistance advisors 
and partner states how to identify optimal degrees of convergence on EU norms and standards 
according to policy domain and the stage of transition of the partner states.    
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Basic free trade – multilateral 
With the EU’s bilateral network of free trade agreements gradually extending to its entire 
neighbourhood, it is logical to envisage a multilateral ‘basic free trade’ area to include 
potentially all of Europe and the Mediterranean, (i.e. not just the ENP partner states, but also 
EFTA/EEA, the Balkan CEFTA states, and eventually Russia). This would require common 
rules of origin, building on the existing Pan-Euro-Med system. The Commission have only 
hinted at something like this in referring to a ‘Neighbourhood economic community’ in their 
recent Communication. This could be an initiative of strategic significance.  
Energy and transport multilateral networks 
Developments in these two sectoral areas have been quite significant, with regional- multilateral 
initiatives in both cases extending from the EU, across the Balkans, into ENP partner states, and 
even into Central Asia and the Middle East – a reminder of the case for variable geometry in the 
wider neighbourhood. These initiatives combine regulatory harmonization to facilitate market 
integration and major investments in cross-border infrastructure networks.  
Movement of persons 
The proposed opening of visa facilitation negotiations, eventually for all partner states, is to be 
greatly welcomed. The status quo is so restrictive that it undoes in the eyes of public opinion of 
the partner states much of the credit that the ENP might win. The efficiency of the consular 
services of many EU member states need also to be improved, and notably those of Belgium as 
host to EU institutions. The EU conditions visa facilitation on also making readmission 
agreements, the costs of which can be very onerous for some partner states, and therefore calls 
for compensating aid. There should be the perspective of visa-free travel for the most 
progressive partner states to aim at. 
Association with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) 
Links between the ENP and the CFSP are being made, first of all through invitation to some 
ENP states to associate with declaratory positions made be EU foreign ministers. This should 
lead to participation in actions too. This foreign policy dimension is partly symbolic, yet it can 
show that ENP becomes an integrated EU policy embracing all three pillars of EU competences.   
Crisis management missions (ESDP) 
This further links to the growing activity of EU/ESDP crisis management operations, which can 
also function as an integrated part of the ENP, either where the ENP partner states host to ESDP 
missions, as for example for border management (Transnistria, Gaza-Rafah), or where they 
contribute forces (such as Moroccans and Ukrainians in Bosnia).  
Black Sea dimension 
With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania there now seems to be consensus on the case for an 
EU initiative in this region, on which a Commission proposal is awaited. A regional-multilateral 
dimension for the Eastern neighbours is logical, although this should be on a much lighter scale 
than for the Barcelona process. Observer status in the BSEC organisation would be logical, but 
not as an exclusive framework for the EU’s actions in the region. The Commission’s new 
‘neighbours of the neighbours’ idea, and the German Presidency’s push for a Central Asia 
initiative, might focus first on Kazakhstan..   
‘ENP light’ for difficult states and non-recognised entities 
There emerge now ad hoc instances of engagement with states whose political regimes rule out 
the possibility of jointly agreed Action Plans, and for certain non-recognised secessionist 
entities. This involves essentially ‘people’ programmes, with selective sanctions such as visa 4 | EMERSON, NOUTCHEVA & POPESCU 
 
bans in some cases, and suggests the need for a pro-active ‘ENP light’ policy concept, to be 
defined in unilateral action plans, as happens now with Belarus. 
Budget resources 
The new European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) contains improvements over 
its predecessor programmes, Tacis and Meda. Particularly welcome for the former Tacis 
beneficiaries is the wider range of capabilities beyond technical assistance (investment funding, 
budgetary support, education, etc.). Nevertheless, there may still be an over-concentration on 
technical assistance projects of types that have proved very difficult to implement effectively. 
The new Governance Facility is disappointingly small, becoming only a token gesture. The new 
sizeable Scholarship Programme for ENP countries and Russia is to be greatly welcomed, and 
its scale could be built up even further in due course. The European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR) turns out to be only marginally improved, after a major debate over 
its performance yielded little. 
Coordination with the IFIs 
The budget’s Neighbourhood Investment Fund (NIF), together with the large expansion planned 
for European Investment Bank (EIB) operations, heightens the importance of organising optimal 
coordination between the European Commission and the international financial institutions 
(EIB, EBRD and the World Bank). Between them, the Commission and the IFIs have huge 
resources and policy-analytical capabilities, with complementary specialisations. Mechanisms 
of dialogue are in place at headquarters and in the field. Nevertheless, the system as a whole 
falls short of achieving all the potential synergies for impacting on the economic reform 
performance of the partner states. The EBRD has developed its niche well in the East. Given 
lesser needs now in the new member states, the EBRD could usefully open operations also in 
the ENP South, where its skills are equally relevant.  
1.2  Structuring ‘ENP plus’ 
Our view of ‘ENP plus’ is that it could mean the basic provisions of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy plus: 
o  an advanced association model for the able and willing partner states,  
o  a strengthening of regional-multilateral schemes,  
o  an upgrading of some of the standard measures being deployed, 
o  an ‘ENP light’ package for states/entities with difficult political regimes. 
The able and willing partner states could be offered the following incentive package: 
o  Advanced association agreement, 
o  Possibilities to participate in agencies, programmes and institutions, 
o  ‘Open door’ language for European partner states, 
o  Deep free trade, going as far as associate EEA status, 
o  Visa facilitation with perspectives of visa-free travel, 
o  Association with CFSP declarations and actions, 
o  Participation in ESDP missions and 
o  Privileged access to performance-related budgetary funds. 
The strengthening of regional-multilateral schemes, thus embracing all partner states, would 
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o  A pan-European multilateral basic free trade area, 
o  Participation in energy and transport networks, 
o  Black Sea dimension, and 
o  Better coordination with the IFIs. 
The strengthening of the standard ENP package would include: 
o  Deep free trade, 
o  Improved ENPI, 
o  Visa facilitation, and 
o  Bigger education/scholarship programmes. 
The ‘ENP light’ package would see the EU adopt ‘people’ programmes unilaterally for states 
with difficult political regimes and for certain non-recognised entities.  
This overall multi-tier structure to the ENP would provide more vivid incentives for partner 
states to achieve the objectives of the Action Plans.  
1.3  ‘ENP plus’ as a strategic necessity 
After the celebration of the EU’s big enlargement of 2004, the context for the ENP has become 
more sombre. To the East there is the need to consolidate the democratic transition in the ENP 
partner states, and to the North to persuade Russia that its national interest lies in a cooperative 
rather than coercive approach to the common neighbourhood. To the South there is the need to 
join in the struggle against radical Islamic terrorism, but at the same time to give more political 
space to all non-violent democratic parties (e.g. including Islamist democrats). Resistance to the 
latter may be counterproductive, playing into the hands of radical Islamic forces. These threats 
from the South also now link to the current crisis of multi-culturalism within the EU.   
On earlier occasions we have both described the EU’s unique potential to develop a 
comprehensive and integrative neighbourhood policy, and have also, as implementation of the 
ENP began, questioned whether it was on course to realise this potential, or to become just a 
‘placebo’.
5 The Commission and Council have both recently concluded that the ENP is both 
indispensable and needs to be strengthened. Yes, indeed. The EU institutions and member states 
could now agree on measures to give the ENP a strategic upgrade. They should make the extra 
effort to make sure of it.  
                                                      
5 M. Emerson, The Wider Europe Matrix, CEPS, December 2003; European Neighbourhood Policy: 
Strategy or Placebo?, CEPS Working Document No. 215, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
November 2004. 6 | EMERSON, NOUTCHEVA & POPESCU 
 
2.  Paradigms and strategic imperatives 
2.1  European discourse and paradigms 
The official discourse of the European Neighbourhood Policy emphasises the values-driven 
logic of the EU’s attempt to export its democratic norms and governance standards to the wider 
neighbourhood. The official pronouncements are clear in their assertion of a strong normative 
component of the EU’s initiatives in the neighbourhood. For example, the European Council on 
14-15 December 2006, reaffirmed its resolve “to strengthen the ENP in order to consolidate a 
ring of prosperity, stability and security based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law 
in the Union’s neighbourhood”. 
Yet, behind the ‘values’ language, there is a discernable EU interest in being surround by “a 
ring of well-governed states”. The European Security Strategy speaks of this: “[i]t is in the 
European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged 
in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or 
exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.”
6  
The ambiguity regarding the EU’s intentions in the neighbourhood extends to the mechanisms 
employed to encourage political and economic change in the partner countries. The background 
against which the EU’s approach to the neighbours has been developed so far has been the 
enlargement experience in Central and Eastern Europe, where the European Commission 
oversaw the transformation process of the future members-to-be through strong conditionality 
and active socialisation.
7 The ENP, however, lacks the major driver of the enlargement process, 
i.e. the membership perspective, which by default changes the nature of the EU’s involvement. 
It makes conditionality much more difficult to practice, especially given the vagueness 
surrounding the ENP incentive package. The pre-conditions for successful conditionality as we 
know them from the enlargement context are absent in the neighbourhood. The potential 
rewards are seen as neither sizable, nor credible, nor achievable within the foreseeable future, 
and the conditions on which they would be delivered are neither precise nor clearly set.
8 
Furthermore, the domestic costs for adopting the EU rules are potentially higher in the 
neighbourhood countries given the authoritarian political regimes in many of them and the level 
of economic development in quite a number of them. As a result, the EU is faced with more 
opponents within partner governments and societies, who are simply unwilling to pay the price 
for alignment with the proposed EU model of governance.  
Are there other instruments the EU can employ in order to influence the pattern of domestic 
change in partner states in a direction that is compatible with the EU-favoured reform path? The 
softer mechanism known from the enlargement process is socialisation, but even in Central and 
Eastern Europe, which was quite open to European normative influence in the 1990s, social 
learning was secondary in importance to the conditionality effects on actors’ behaviour.
9 The 
official ENP discourse puts a lot of emphasis on ‘joint ownership’ stressing the negotiated 
nature of the action plans and the voluntary character of the process. On the other hand, to 
compensate the EU could build stronger alliances on matters of policy conditionality between 
its budgetary instruments and the IFIs (EIB, EBRD and the World Bank). 
                                                      
6 “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.  
7 See Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to 
the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 11, No. 4, 
2004, pp. 669-687.  
8 Ibid., pp. 671-675.  
9 See the edited volume by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of 
Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca, NY and London, Cornell University Press, 2005. EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY TWO YEARS ON: TIME INDEED FOR AN ‘ENP PLUS’ | 7 
 
The initial experience with agreeing on the contents of the action plans reveals that the ENP 
states are not equally willing to embrace the full spectrum of reform actions suggested by the 
EU. Judging by the partners’ first responses to the ENP and depending on their stated ambitions, 
one can identify four groups of states: 1) the willing partners who not only aspire to cultivate 
close association with the EU (and in the case of some, this aims at full membership) but also 
accept the domestic reform agenda that goes with it; 2) the passive partners who are ready to 
develop a more substantive relationship with the EU but are not keen to go through the domestic 
reform process this implies; 3) the reluctant partners who are unenthusiastic about either deeper 
ties with the EU or domestic reforms; and 4) the excluded partners whom the EU itself has 
deemed ineligible for the ENP initiative because of gross divergence in normative orientations 
and policies, or have excluded themselves.  
The geographical distinction between Southern and Eastern neighbours seems inappropriate to 
capture the differentiation in reform aptitude and interest in European integration of partner 
states. There are neighbours from both East and South in all group categories identified above. 
If the EU is serious about differentiating between neighbours based on their ambitions and 
merits, the ENP will need differentiated policy packages to take this into account. A strategy 
that is geared towards encouraging the willing partners may fail to have an impact on reluctant 
partners. Conversely, an approach targeting the reluctant states through negative instruments is 
obviously inappropriate for the countries performing well.  
This emphasis on bilateral relations is not to disregard the regional-multilateral dimension, 
which is also seen in the overall EU policy towards the Southern and the Eastern neighbours. 
The Barcelona process in the South and the plans to launch a Black Sea regional initiative in the 
East are complementary instruments which add to the bilateral side of the ENP, and seek to 
stimulate good neighbourly relations among partner states.  
2.2  The new strategic imperatives 
The ENP was conceived in a very Euro-centric political context. The huge enlargement into 
Central and Eastern Europe was for some 15 years the major strategic response to the collapse 
of the Communist regimes and of the Soviet Union. The leading role of the EU as the normative 
power in the new Europe was uncontested, also receiving strong support from the United States. 
The accession conditionality machine achieved impressive results.  
Today the strategic landscape looks very different, for reasons that were not anticipated at the 
turn of the millennium. There are five such reasons, all of which combine to raise the stakes for 
the ENP to the level of a new strategic challenge.  
The first of these is the ominously changing situation in the wider Middle East, with a cascade 
of linked disasters: Al Qaeda’s 9/11 and continuing global terrorism, the unsuccessful war in 
Iraq, the alarmingly difficult NATO engagement in Afghanistan and the strategic challenge 
posed by Iran not only as a would-be nuclear power, but also an Islamic normative power. 
The second is the rising economic strength and political assertiveness of Russia. Its huge gains 
in oil and gas earnings flowed from the rising world commodity prices, which in turn had been 
influenced by these Middle East developments. But in addition Russia has pushed its 
assertiveness to the point of coercive tactics through the energy weapon and other trade 
sanctions towards its ‘near abroad’, which of course is the same as the EU’s eastern 
neighbourhood. Russia also develops ideological instruments illustrated by the ‘sovereign 
democracy’ slogan, and thus seeks to regain a role as normative power too.
10 
                                                      
10 Nicu Popescu, Russia’s Soft Power Ambitions, CEPS Policy Brief No. 115, October 2006.  8 | EMERSON, NOUTCHEVA & POPESCU 
 
The third is the rise of new world powers, especially China. Its influence is growing and is 
already approaching that of the wider European neighbourhood in Central Asia and Africa. This 
also can be seen not only as a growing economic presence, but also as a normative power, with 
China’s own model of a dazzling economic performance delivered by an authoritarian state, 
thus challenging the traditional Western consensus that twins economic and political 
liberalisation. 
The fourth is the currently impaired international prestige of the United States, at least in the 
Muslim world, although not so much in the Central and Eastern Europe. 
Fifth and finally there is the virtual stop to the EU’s own enlargement process. While at least a 
pause and slowdown was to be expected after the jump from 15 to 27, the failure of the 
Constitution to be ratified has sown self-doubts on the nature of the European project, and 
enhanced the arguments of those opposing further enlargement. This has inter alia meant 
discouragement for the European aspirations of several Eastern neighbours.  
It follows from the above that if the objectives of the ENP are to be seriously pursued, there has 
to be a compensating reinforcement of the policy itself. This could in principle come from the 
measures described below. However the weight of the new strategic challenges calls also for the 
EU to think through its strategy in relation to the other two major external actors in the ENP 
area – Russia and the United States.   
The US, for its part, is omnipresent in both neighbourhoods and pursues its own interests and 
agendas. From an ideological point of view, its objective to spread democracy worldwide is 
entirely compatible with the EU’s wish to see the democratisation of its wider neighbourhood, 
even if their instruments and style are so different. The complementarity between the EU 
actions and the US actions in the European neighbourhood has worked well throughout the post-
Communist period, and there is no reason why this should not continue or be given a fresh 
boost. In the Middle East, there have been serious divergences, for many years over the Israel-
Palestinian conflict, and more recently over Iraq. The EU has worked hard to be even-handed 
over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Quartet, in partnership with the US. But with the 
latter’s pro-Israeli orientation, this has damaged the EU’s image in the Arab world. Maybe in a 
next political period, the scope for more effective EU-US collaboration in the European 
neighbourhood will return. The new strategic context requires this. New or reinforced alliances 
could be found, for example, through coordinating much more powerfully the EU’s financial 
instruments in the ENP area with those of the IFIs and the US itself; and similarly over the 
question of engagement with Muslim democrat actors to the South.  
Russia’s assertive foreign policy behaviour, however, can be seen as both a challenge and an 
opportunity, given the counterproductive effects of its coercive policies towards Ukraine, 
Moldova, Georgia and lately even Belarus – countries that have been prime subjects of the 
ENP.
11 The more Russia abuses its power resources, the more it alienates its neighbours instead 
of attracting them to its own sphere of gravity. The EU is in a position to benefit from the 
unintended consequences of Russia’s own actions in its ‘near abroad’ by becoming even more 
attractive to the willing partners from the Eastern neighbourhood. The exercise of Russia’s hard 
power thus has direct positive implications for the EU’s soft power. Pressured by Russia, the 
willing reformers in the East are even more drawn to the EU. And this is irrespective of the 
EU’s ambiguous language about membership perspectives. However, in the best case, 
awareness of these trends in Moscow might induce it to recalibrate its tactics and conception of 
                                                      
11 See Robert Larsson, “Sweden and the NEPG – a pilot study of the north European Gas Pipeline and 
Sweden’s dependence on Russian energy”, FOI Defence Research Agency, Stockholm, June 2006 
(www.foi.se). This study records 55 energy supply interruptions by Russia to its neighbours in the post-
Soviet period, all except 10 of which had geo-political overtones.    EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY TWO YEARS ON: TIME INDEED FOR AN ‘ENP PLUS’ | 9 
 
its national interests in the common neighbourhood, leading ultimately to abstention from 
grossly coercive behaviour, and willingness to view cooperation with the EU in the region as a 
positive sum game. 
There are, therefore, important effects of cross-conditionality and cross-socialisation that have 
to be taken into consideration when assessing the potential impact of the ENP on the partner 
states. The ENP has in principle not been designed to compete with other major players such as 
Russia, or to counter other strategic initiatives, or to be strongly allied to the US. Yet the time 
for these new dimensions to the ENP has evidently arrived. 
3.  State of play among the partner states 
The key implementation step of the ENP in its first two years of operation has been the 
preparation of bilateral Action Plans, starting with the most willing partner states. As of March 
2007, there has been the agreement and publication of 5 Action Plans to the East and 7 to the 
South. Our independent view of the attitudes and interests of the partner states are given in 
Annex A, and summarised in Table 1. In this schema, the partner states and entities are divided 
into four categories, with a distinction between ‘willing’ and ‘passive’ partners among the states 
that have agreed Action Plans, and another distinction between the ‘reluctant’ and the 
‘excluded’ among states and entities without agreed Action Plans. These categories are 
subjective assessments of the authors, and have no official status on the side of the EU or the 
partner states themselves. However they may serve as a basis for a more marked differentiation 
of the ENP policies by groups of partner states, in order to strengthen the play of incentives.  
With nine states identified as ‘willing partners’, this is quite an impressive score, given the 
rather weak perceived incentives deployed by the EU. The motivations of these states are 
varying mixes of ‘positives’ and ‘negatives’. The ‘positives’ are desires to integrate and identify 
more closely with the EU. This is clearest in the case of several European neighbours that aspire 
to full membership of the EU (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and to a degree Armenia). To the 
South the most positive partner is Morocco, which attempted a membership application in 1987; 
today it has no such expectations, but nonetheless wishes to integrate more with the EU. These 
inclinations are also manifest in Tunisia for whom the ‘positives’ are mainly economic.  Jordan 
has a seriously reformist and modernising outlook in the economic domain. Israel is ‘positive’ 
because of its largely European origins, advanced economy and shared democratic values.  
However the ‘negatives’ are also important, in that these countries are turning to Europe as a 
source of partnership and support in part because of perceived threats coming from their own 
other neighbours. The former Soviet states are looking for support as a counterweight to 
continuing pressure from Russia. Armenia feels especially vulnerable because of threats from 
Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh, which are explicitly military in some Azeri political 
discourse, and with growing economic cooperation between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. 
Of the Southern states, Morocco looks to Europe in part as protection from Algeria, with whom 
it has an unresolved dispute over Western Sahara. The Palestinian Authority looks to Europe as 
a more even-handed partner than the US over its conflict with Israel, and as a lifeline in recent 
times as supplier of financial aid. 
These willing partners are thus motivated by varying mixes and weights of geo-political 
concerns and European identity factors. A universal factor among all these states is their desire 
to receive more from the EU than is so far on offer in the Action Plans. To the East this wish for 
‘more’ comes with disappointment and even bitterness in some cases over the failure of the EU 
to meet their aspirations, as symbolised by the EU’s refusal to grant ‘membership perspectives’. 
This in turn has meant that some of these states, which might have entered willingly into the 
EU’s processes of political conditionality, have not seen sufficient incentives to do.  10 | EMERSON, NOUTCHEVA & POPESCU 
 
Table 1. Categorisation of partner states of the ENP 
With Action Plans   Without Action Plans  
Willing partners 
East 
Moldova – European identity, don’t take no for 
answer, wants more* 
Georgia – idem 
Ukraine – idem  
Armenia – want more, but has other security 
priorities 
South 
Morocco – wants more 
Tunisia – economic anchorage to the EU 
Palestine – desperate for aid 
Israel – European identity 
Jordan – reformist partner 
Reluctant partners 
East  
[Russia – from the beginning excluded itself   
formally from ENP, but is included in ENPI and 
four common spaces resemble Action Plans] 
 
 
South 
Algeria – oil rich, averse to conditionality, in 
ENPI & Barcelona process 
 
Passive partners 
East 
Azerbaijan – oil rich; govt. lags behind civil 
society over political values 
South 
Lebanon – superficial participant, desperate for 
support  
Egypt – regional leader, averse to conditionality  
Excluded partners 
East 
Belarus – lack of democracy currently excludes 
activation of ENP 
South 
Syria – in ENPI and Barcelona process, but   
activation of ENP currently excluded 
Libya – in ENPI & Barcelona process, but   
activation of ENP currently excluded 
Excluded entities 
East 
Transnistria – non-recognised entity 
Abkhazia – idem 
South Ossetia – idem  
Nagorno Karabakh – idem 
South 
Western Sahara – occupied territory 
* “Don’t take ‘no’ for an answer” means that the partner state considers the EU’s refusal of membership 
perspective to be unsustainable in the long run if it sticks to its European ambitions, and therefore considers the 
EU’s lack of incentive itself to lack credibility.   
However, there are some signs that the Eastern neighbours are ‘not taking no for an answer’. 
The EU has some track record of being negative towards candidates it considers problematic, as 
was the case for some years with the Baltic states; but this negative position proved 
unsustainable.
12 Accordingly there is to some degree a double twist to the credibility argument. 
The EU officially declines to offer credible incentives for negotiating conditionality over 
political standards. But this lack of credible incentives is itself perceived by some as lacking in 
credibility, and could be reversed in due course. The partner states in this situation may go 
ahead with adoption of EU standards. 
The reasons why Azerbaijan, Egypt and Lebanon may be considered ‘passive’ partners are also 
rather clear. Oil-rich Azerbaijan is in a robust position economically and politically, is immune 
from Russian energy pressure. Its leadership is not interested in democracy, although its civil 
society is. Egypt regards itself as a leading regional power, is averse to any suggestion of 
political conditionality and was in no hurry to conclude its Action Plan. Lebanon is so 
                                                      
12 The President of Estonia, Tuomas Ilves, constantly makes this point, saying that the EU tried for 
several years in the early 1990s to discourage the applications of the Baltic states to join the EU. 
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preoccupied with its grave security concerns that its is understandably distracted from 
implementing seriously the Action plan. 
The ‘reluctant’ partners without Action Plans may be compared to the ‘passive’ partners with 
Action Plans just discussed. Algeria in particular may be compared with Azerbaijan. Algeria’s 
lack of interest in negotiating an Action Plan is partly founded on its oil and gas wealth, which 
is being used to reassert the country’s regional role, but in addition there is the post-colonial 
legacy that makes any suggestion of political conditionality a hyper-sensitive matter.  
Russia has clearly excluded itself, on the ground that it simply does not belong in the company 
of the ENP partner states. It sees itself as a co-equal power with the EU on the European scene, 
viewing its ‘near abroad’ (i.e. the EU’s Eastern neighbours) as a natural sphere of influence. On 
the other hand, the EU and Russia have negotiated in the ‘Four Common Spaces’ subject matter 
that has considerable overlap with the ENP Action Plans, especially in the economic area. 
Moreover Russia has not objected to sharing in the EU’s financial instrument (the new 
European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument – ENPI). Russia is also a key player in some of the 
EU’s regional initiatives, such as the Northern Dimension, which leads further to the imminent 
question of how Russia may be involved in the forthcoming Black Sea initiative. 
Among the Eastern neighbours, Belarus is clearly identified by the EU as an ENP partner state, 
but for whom the relationship cannot be activated until its political regime democratises. 
Interestingly Belarus now wishes to be accepted as an ENP partner state, partly under the impact 
of Russia’s high-handed energy tactics in January 2007, but there have been no policy moves in 
Minsk to support this new desire. The EU itself is pushed by the new member states to become 
more pro-active in Belarus, and the Commission drew up a quite significant ‘non-paper’ 
outlining possible measures,
13 and now a strategy paper for ENPI projects in Belarus,
14 which 
has become virtually a unilateral action plan.  
To the South the EU excludes Syria on political grounds, despite the conclusion of the 
negotiations of the association agreement within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Libya is 
similarly excluded, but its former pariah status has been attenuated with its renouncing of its 
nuclear programme in 2003. The EU has been edging towards negotiations with Libya over its 
inclusion in the Barcelona process and the ENP, but these tendencies are currently on hold.  
The EU’s relationships with the non-recognised secessionist entities of the Eastern 
neighbourhood – Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh – and of the 
South in the case of the Western Sahara were until recently quite simple. The EU and its ENP 
largely ignored these entities, apart from humanitarian and rehabilitation projects in South 
Ossetia. Recently, however, the EU has become more interested in these frozen conflicts. There 
is now the EU Border Assistance Mission surrounding Transnistria, and the EU maintains a visa 
ban on the top leadership there. The EU professes that it is becoming more engaged with the 
South Caucasus conflicts, leading to ideas for offering aid for educational projects and civil 
society and for enhancing people-to-people contacts.
15 Indeed the EU cannot hope to see the 
peoples of these entities converge more on European values without engaging with them.  
                                                      
13 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/belarus/intro/non_paper_1106.pdf 
14 European Commission, ENPI – Belarus – Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and National Indicative 
Programme 2007-2010. 
15 N. Popescu, Europe's Unrecognised Neighbours: The EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, CEPS 
Working Document No. 260, CEPS, Brussels, 15 March 2007. 
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4.  A 15-point programme on selected policy issues 
Point 1. The optimal bilateral-regional-multilateral balance 
The EU is searching for the optimal balance of bilateral, regional and multilateral elements of 
the ENP in a step-by-step process, where as the starting point for the ENP saw the East and 
South in quite opposite situations.  
To the South the Barcelona process has been essentially multilateral, but now the ENP has 
added a bilateral dimension through the Action Plans, which is a positive step. Problems with 
the Barcelona process under the heading ‘once-size-fits-all’ have been widely recognised. 
Nonetheless the Barcelona institutional framework is very substantial at all levels, from 
meetings of ministers and senior officials, to the parliamentary assembly, and diverse forums, 
conferences and networking projects of researchers; moreover Barcelona is not being disbanded. 
On the other hand, the ENP East has so far had no multilateral activity at the political level. 
Only at the regional level of the South Caucasus have there been common meetings between the 
EU and these three partner states. For the future the Commission has floated a number of ideas, 
including multilateral agreements in the transport and energy fields, and the prospect of a 
regional Black Sea initiative.
16 The Commission is also now proposing a first pan-ENP event 
(East and South together), with a high-level meeting in 2007 for all ENP partner states with 
Action Plans, and with a view to discussing the ‘strengthened ENP’ proposed by the 
Commission. In addition ENP partner states may be invited to briefings and consultations by the 
EU in international forae, such as the UN, Council of Europe and OSCE. These ideas are 
positive.  
There remains the issue whether these regional-multilateral initiatives should give priority to 
bringing ENP East and South together, or focus more on each separately. Given the weight of 
the existing Barcelona architecture, and the absence of any intention to disband it, the most 
plausible focus would seem to be on taking East and South separately, therefore giving special 
attention to building up ENP East regional-multilateralism. Given the imminence of proposals 
from the Commission on Black Sea cooperation we return to this below (point 8). In the field of 
trade policy, there is also a case for pan-European multilateralism, to which we also return 
below (point 7).  
The bringing together of East and South in a single ENP initially saw anomalies: to the East the 
ENP has been entirely bilateral, whereas the Barcelona process has been largely regional-
multilateral. However a better synthesis seems now to be emerging, with ENP adding a bilateral 
dimension for the South, and with ideas now emerging for regional-multilateral initiatives to the 
East (Black Sea, energy and transport networks). A strategic regional-multilateral dimension 
for East and South is now conceivable in the trade area.    
Point 2. Advanced association (or otherwise named) agreements 
The early ENP strategy document of the Commission said that the Action Plan process could 
lead on to the negotiation of ‘European Neighbourhood Agreements’.
17 Its most recent 
document of December 2006 is silent on this subject.  
In practice, however, the EU and Ukraine have launched negotiations on 5 March 2007 for a 
new ‘Enhanced Agreement’, which would replace the expiring Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA). The mandate for this negotiation reveals that this would be a first in a new 
generation of EU treaties with third countries, in being a comprehensive, multi-pillar agreement, 
                                                      
16 European Commission, COM(2006)726, op. cit. 
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covering economic issues, justice and home affairs, foreign and security policy and political 
dialogue. This agreement could establish a template for other ENP partner states. An uncertain 
question is what these new agreements should be called, which is viewed by partner states as 
much more than a mere semantic question, signalling on the contrary the political importance of 
the matter. In particular, Ukraine has reacted negatively to the term ‘Neighbourhood 
Agreement’, implying a status of definitive exclusion from the EU. For this reason the parties 
have adopted for the time being a diplomatic-bureaucratic compromise with the term ‘Enhanced 
Agreement’. This carries a minimally positive connotation, but will hardly serve as a political 
banner for an ambitious Europeanising reform agenda in Kyiv. Alternatively there might be 
‘Advanced Association Agreements’. 
The EU should firm up the prospects of next-generation treaties with ENP partner states, 
whether they are called ‘Advanced Association Agreements’ or otherwise, for willing and able 
partner states, and whose content would encompass the maximum ‘ENP plus’ agenda.  
Point 3. Institutional issues 
In a recent Communication, the Commission has thoroughly explored the question of how ENP 
partner states might be associated with, or become full participants in various agencies and 
policy programmes of the EU.
18 It reviews comprehensively the landscape of the EU’s rapidly 
growing number of agencies, and adopts general criteria for assessing the case for the 
association or inclusion of partner states. The Council largely endorsed these proposals on 5 
March 2007.  
The Commission lists in its review no less than 30 existing or proposed agencies, covering such 
domains as food safety, border management, police cooperation, etc., of which 20 have 
provisions in their statutes providing for possible third-country participation. The Commission 
further lists no less than 34 Community programmes in which ENP states might potentially 
participate, such as for scientific research and fundamental rights and justice, etc., of which 17 
already contain provisions for third-country participation.  
The policy line proposed by the Commission is for the EU to agree to a general commitment to 
be open to participation by ENP partner states, and for consultations to be held with a view to 
selective and gradual participation of individual ENP states on the basis of identified mutual 
interest and the meeting of functional prerequisites.  
These developments are entirely positive, but the initiative could have been taken one step 
further in relation to some of the EU’s political institutions. The European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee could consider openings for observer members in the case of 
the most advanced agreements. Presumably the European Parliament could invite observers on 
its own initiative.  
The European Economic Area (EEA) provides further examples of partial institutional 
participation in committees of the Council and Commission in the policy-shaping process over 
new market regulations.
19 Such special arrangements cannot be proliferated, however, without 
placing burdens on already-stretched institutional structures. One idea could be for some of 
most advanced ENP states (e.g. Israel today) to accede to the EEA, or to become associate 
members of the EEA after adopting a tailor-made programme of compliance with the EU acquis 
(an ‘EEA-light’). 
                                                      
18 European Commission, “On the general approach to enable ENP partner countries to participate in 
Community agencies and Community programmes”, COM(2006)724 final, 4 December 2006.  
19 For a succinct account of these arrangements, see Marius Vahl and Nina Grolimund, Integration 
without Membership: Switzerland’s Bilateral Sectoral Agreements with the EU, CEPS Paperback, CEPS, 
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The detailed review undertaken by the Commission of possible participation of ENP states in 
EU agencies and programmes is a positive initiative, to be followed up with the most advanced 
ENP partner states, taking care however to avoid bureaucratic congestion. There are some 
more ambitious options for consideration, for example observer status in the European 
Parliament, or associate membership of the EEA.     
Point 4. The membership perspective question 
The membership perspective question is a highly controversial one for the ENP. The EU’s 
official line as of the Commission’s latest document stresses that the ENP is “distinct from the 
enlargement process” and “without a specific prospect for accession”, yet this is “without 
prejudging how their relationship with the EU may develop in the future, in accordance with 
treaty provisions”.
20  
Decoding this language it is well known that there are divergences of view over the 
‘membership perspective’ question with regard to the Ukraine case in particular. Ukraine has a 
constituency of support, led by Poland and Sweden, in favour of offering this mega incentive, 
subject of course to fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria. On the other hand, France leads the 
camp of member states not wanting to offer any such perspective.  
The wording quoted above seems to reflect a slight softening of the language, in that the 
reference to treaty provisions refers presumably to Article 49 of the Treaties: “Any European 
State which respects the [political] principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a 
member of the Union.” 
The debate has been linked over the last six months to the discussion about the ‘absorptive 
capacity’ of the EU, with some politicians arguing for the EU to fix ‘final frontiers’ that would 
cover less than the whole of the Council of Europe’s membership map, to the exclusion for 
example of Turkey and Ukraine.
21 The Commission was invited by the European Council to 
report on this issue, and did so in November 2006 in a document on enlargement strategy
22. The 
Commission refused to embrace the final frontiers proposition, relabelled the concept as 
‘integration capacity’, and basically said that the EU needed further institutional reforms, with 
which “the carefully managed accession process will continue”.   
The EU risks doing itself geo-political damage by adopting an unnecessarily hard position in 
this regard, since this amounts to positive encouragement to Russia to maintain an aggressive 
policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood countries; whereas to take a more positive but strictly 
conditional line risks nothing but creating a better incentive to the partner states to work towards 
EU values. The EU’s crisis over the Constitution has made it obvious to all that the enlargement 
process is subject to the adequate development of the EU’s institutional capacity, and that this 
cannot be guaranteed today, nor can it be said when and if it will be assured at some future 
point.  
Harsh messages of outright exclusion of membership perspectives for European ENP states, 
which are unnecessarily harmful to the EU’s geo-strategic interests, seem now to be replaced 
by a careful ‘open door’ language in keeping with the Treaty.    
                                                      
20 European Commission, COM(2006)726, op. cit.  
21 M. Emerson, S. Aydin, G. Noutcheva and J. De Clerk-Sachsse, Just what is this Absorption Capacity of 
the EU?, CEPS Policy Brief No. 113, CEPS, Brussels, September 2006. 
22 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007 Paper, including 
Annexed Special report on the EU’s Capacity to Integrate New Members, COM(2006)649, 8 November 
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Point 5. Democracy promotion 
Although the ENP in principle gives first place to democracy promotion, human rights, the rule 
of law and the development of civil society, the Commission’s recent document is surprisingly 
silent on these subjects. Some attempt is made to gloss over this omission with the aid of the 
term ‘governance’, but this can cover many things. There is no problem with the Action Plans 
embracing the democracy agenda wholesale of the Orange and Rose Revolution countries. 
However elsewhere the ‘joint ownership’ of the Action Plans has emasculated the ‘democracy 
priority’, as in Azerbaijan to the East, and Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan to the South. For 
the implementation of the Action Plans, the Commission generally requests a human rights 
subcommittee of officials, where critical issues may be raised. The vigour with which these 
subcommittees may be used is not yet evident.  
There has been a major political debate among the EU institutions on the possible reform of the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which is a worldwide 
democracy promotion instrument, including the neighbourhood area. This is not part of the 
ENP, and so its operations do not have to be jointly agreed. However there have been technical 
problems with extremely onerous contracting and accounting procedures, which have made it 
difficult to use even by the experienced EU NGOs and quite impractical for most activists in the 
civil society of partner states. Various proposals were discussed (e.g. to establish a grant-giving 
democracy foundation, or a more active role for the European Parliament). Neither idea proved 
acceptable to the Commission and Council, and the new framework regulation for the EIDHR 
adopted in December 2006 reflects only marginal improvements. The budget allocated to the 
EIDHR is still substantial for the 2007-13 period, with the annual expenditures set to rise 
gradually from €140 million in 2007 to €160 million in 2013, totalling €1 billion for the whole 
period.  
In principle the reform agendas of the Action Plans should be widely debated among the major 
political actors and civil society organisations in the partner states. In some cases this has been 
initiated, for example in Lebanon (where Hezbollah participated actively). But this has been an 
exception rather than the rule, and knowledge about the ENP in such circles remains little or 
none at all. The inclusion of the elites of opposition parties, such as Muslim democratic 
movements, in conference, study visit and research activities has been limited to ad hoc 
initiatives of some member states, and to non-governmental foundations and think tanks. In this 
soft diplomatic activity, the EU lags behind the US, whose state-supported NGOs, private 
foundations and universities are highly active in ENP states such as Egypt and Morocco. This 
weak performance of the ENP in the democracy field is coming at a high cost to the political 
credibility and reputation of the EU, especially in the Southern partner states. The EU’s refusal 
to deal with Hamas after democratic electoral success in 2006 was seen as a message of   
political insincerity throughout the region. 
Beyond its declaration of principles, there is room for improvement in the EU’s performance as 
active promoter of democracy. At the operational level there are still technical problems of the 
instruments not being user-friendly, and political inhibitions over engaging with all democratic 
movements (including Islamist parties in the Southern partner states).  
Point 6. Deep free trade – bilateral 
The conceptualisation of the economic content of the ENP was initially headlined with a vague 
promise of ‘a stake in the internal market’, without this being seriously defined. The Action 
Plans have set out catalogues of 300 bulleted action points, many related to the EU’s market 
acquis, but with little indication how these should be operationalised, or how the EU might 
contribute. 16 | EMERSON, NOUTCHEVA & POPESCU 
 
Recently there has been some progress in defining the economic core to the ENP, as now 
represented by the ‘deep free trade’ concept. In 2005-06, an independent study was contracted 
by the Commission on the feasibility of free trade between the EU and Ukraine, which 
advocated a ‘deep free trade’ strategy in considerable detail.
23 Deep free trade is being 
contrasted with the conventional ‘simple’ free trade, which consists of scrapping tariffs on trade 
in goods. Deep free trade, as developed in the Ukraine study, would cover the removal of non-
tariff barriers for goods, the complete liberalisation of service sectors, regulatory reforms of 
service sectors drawing selectively on the EU acquis, corporate governance reforms also 
drawing on European models and supporting investments in transport and energy networks. The 
term ‘deep free trade’ is now built into the terms of reference for negotiations with Ukraine as 
soon as it accedes to the WTO. The Commission’s recent Communication goes as far as 
advocating the pursuit of a ‘deep and comprehensive FTA’ approach for all ENP partners.
24 
Nevertheless, for the policy-maker – in both Brussels and the partner states – the key analytical 
task is to judge the optimal degree of reliance on the EU acquis. This calls for cost-benefit 
analysis in numerous sectors subject to complex regulatory regimes (financial services, civil 
aviation, product standards, etc). In some cases, such as for product standards there is a clear 
argument for simply copying the EU standards. In other cases, the full EU regulatory regime 
would be excessively burdensome, such as for sophisticated financial services. However these 
choices of optimal reliance on the rules of the EU single market require expert knowledge, 
analysis and presentation, and should be made available by the Commission in the form of an 
‘ENP Regulatory Handbook’.  
The EU has been excessively conservative with Georgia and Moldova on free trade. It 
disappointed Georgia by not being more forthcoming when the government opted for a radical 
policy of opening the economy. Also in the case of Moldova there has been a regrettable 
development with Romania’s accession to the EU, in that the existing Moldovan-Romanian free 
trade agreement had to be scrapped on 1 January 2007, to bring Romania into line with the EU.  
The adoption of the ‘deep free trade’ concept as the economic backbone of the ENP is positive. 
But the Commission needs to help the partner states work this out in practice, with the aid of an 
‘ENP Regulatory Handbook’. Really deep free trade will be for the most advanced partner 
states.    
Point 7. Basic free trade – multilateral  
Given that virtually the whole of the ENP area already has or is scheduled to negotiate free trade 
agreements with the EU, there is an obvious case to build on this with a regional-multilateral 
initiative. The multilateral quality of such a system would mean that all participants would be 
sharing free trade with each other, as opposed to the present hub-and-spoke bilateralism 
between the EU and each of its neighbours. It would also require an extension of the Pan-Euro-
Med ‘rules of origin’ regime, which allows for accumulation of value-added between 
participants (e.g. a cascade of value-added in the processing and trade of inputs between more 
than two countries before the final product is sold).
25 Such a system would be beneficial as a 
huge simplification of present trading arrangements and as a spur to integrated industrial 
structures that would be better equipped to face the global competition.  
The Commission seems to be thinking along these lines in their recent document, referring to a 
longer-term vision of this kind, using the term ‘Neighbourhood Economic Community’ 
                                                      
23 M. Emerson et al., The Prospects of Deep Free Trade between the EU and Ukraine, CEPS, 2006. 
24 European Commission, COM(2006)726, op. cit. 
25 For a short account of the Pan-Euro-Med system, see articles in the EFTA Bulletin, July 2006 
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(NEC).
26 But their text is not explicit. The most advanced ENP states might constitute a core 
group to get an NEC started, including for example members of the ‘Agadir group’ of Southern 
states (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan) and among the Eastern states (possibly Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine). EFTA would surely follow suit, and Turkey too by virtue of its customs 
union with the EU. The CEFTA states of the Balkans, which have scrapped their complex 
matrix of bilateral free trade agreements in favour of a single regional-multilateral scheme, 
would also be invited to join the NEC. Finally, the system should also be open to Russia, whose 
participation would be in the spirit of its Common Economic Space agreement with the EU. 
An NEC would be a strategic initiative politically as well as economically, contributing profile 
and backbone to the ENP as a whole. It would fit logically alongside the planned bilateral ‘deep 
free trade’ initiatives. A multilateralisation of the ‘deep free trade’ agenda is implausible 
because it goes beyond external trade policy issues into overlapping matters of domestic 
economic governance. The content of the NEC could, however, go beyond the simplest free 
trade formula (just scrapping tariffs), and include a basic agenda of harmonized customs 
procedures, minimal service sector liberalisation and the adoption of EU product standards. The 
NEC idea might best be opened up with the aid of a detailed feasibility study.  
Beyond bilateral free trade agreements now envisaged for the whole ENP area, the Commission 
hints at the case for a regional-multilateral project, which would be more efficient. Such a 
scheme should be open to the whole of Europe and the Mediterranean (ENP, EEA, EFTA, 
CEFTA and Russia). This would be a strategic initiative, suitable however for basic free trade, 
and going alongside deep free trade agreements which will have to be differentiated and 
therefore bilateral. 
Point 8. Energy and transport networks 
In the energy field there have been significant developments. Starting in the Balkans, rather than 
in the ENP region, a new Energy Community Treaty entered into force in 2006, which 
effectively integrates all the non-member states of South-East Europe into the EU’s single 
energy market. This provides for adoption by the non-member states of relevant parts of the 
energy and environmental acquis, in particular so as to permit cross-border energy transmission 
and to facilitate new investments. However Ukraine and Moldova, as well as Norway, have 
applied to join this Treaty, and the Commission is reflecting on other possible membership 
applications – presumably from other ENP states. This is an important regional-multilateral 
mechanism, which could well be extended from the EU and the Balkans to ENP partner states. 
For electricity it raises technical issues of synchronous connection to the West European UCTE 
system, which the Balkan states are apparently ready for.   
The ‘Baku initiative’ joins together some ENP partner states, Central Asia and Turkey, and is 
now a structured process, from ministerial to working group level, addressing energy policy 
issues, with special reference to regulatory, safety, environmental and investment promotion 
issues. The Baku initiative embraces the earlier Inogate technical assistance programme. In the 
present energy context with priority needs to diversify gas supplies, there are concrete projects 
requiring support, for example the Nabucco gas pipeline which will go from Central Europe to 
Turkey, and will have to connect with Caspian and Middle East supplies. The change of 
leadership in Turkmenistan may facilitate a fresh look at Azeri-Turkmen cooperation over off-
shore deposits, which could augment supplies in the pipelines beginning in Baku. Kazakhstan is 
also studying the possibility of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. For Ukraine the Commission has 
joined with the EIB and EBRD in a programme for joint funding of hydrocarbon investments, 
and this may become illustrative of the potential of the three institutions to work together.   
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In the transport field, there has also been a significant multilateral initiative, the High Level 
Group chaired by Loyola de Palacio, preparing the extension of the major trans-European 
transport axes to neighbouring countries and regions.
27 This was prepared by officials from 
every country of Europe, including the Balkans, ENP partner states, Russia and the 
Mediterranean. It defined five major transport axes, including two of importance to the ENP. 
The Central Axis will link Central Europe to Ukraine and the Black Sea and on through an 
inland waterway connection to the Caspian Sea; with further links from Ukraine to the Trans-
Siberian railway and Don/Volga inland waterway. The South-Eastern Axis will link the Balkans 
to Turkey, the South Caucasus and Middle East. Building on this work the Commission adopted 
in January 2007 new guidelines as first steps in a comprehensive policy. The European 
Investment Bank has a newly expanded mandate for operations in ENP region.  
The energy and transport domains are seeing important initiatives for extending the EU’s 
infrastructures and networks into the neighbourhood. The EU’s increased financial capabilities, 
for both grants and lending finance, can help these plans take concrete shape.  
Point 9. Movement of people 
In its recent Communication, the Commission concludes that the EU has not yet got the balance 
right between border opening and border restricting measures. “The Union cannot fully deliver 
on aspect so the ENP if the ability to undertake short-term travel is constrained as it is currently. 
… An enhanced ENP will therefore require a very serious examination of how visa procedures 
can be made less of an obstacle to legitimate travel from neighbouring countries.”
28 It goes on to 
propose negotiations of visa facilitation and re-admission agreements with all ENP partner 
states that have Action Plans in force. An agreement was reached in 2006 with Ukraine, 
modelled on one that was made with Russia earlier, and negotiations with Moldova are 
underway. Under these agreements certain categories (students, researchers, businessmen, NGO 
representatives, journalists and public servants) will have easier and simplified access to EU 
visas. Many studies have indicated that the visa regimes have very little effect on the reduction 
of or fight against illegal immigration. The prospect of visa-free travel should be held out as an 
incentive to the most advanced partner states.  
While these negotiations at the EU level are to be welcomed, the responsibilities of individual 
member states for the modernisation and efficiency of the consular services is also vital. EU 
member states lag behind countries such as Australia and the US in not yet making on-line visa 
applications possible. The rating of the services of individual EU member states varies from the 
quite good to the dreadful. The case of Belgium deserves special attention as the host to large 
numbers of visitors concerned with European affairs (officials, business people, students, 
journalists, researchers, i.e. virtually all elements of the elites of the partner states): its consular 
services are among the most criticised. The Commission proposes improved cooperation 
between the member states, with the creation of common visa-application centres, which is 
surely needed given the number of small EU member states which cannot have consular offices 
everywhere. 
The EU strictly conditions visa facilitation upon conclusion of readmission agreements, i.e. the 
obligation to accept back illegal migrants entering the EU from the partner state (whether a 
national of that state or from a third country).
29 These return and readmission treaties have been 
                                                      
27 Report from the High Level Group chaired by Loyola de Palacio, Networks for peace and development: 
Extension of the major trans-European transport axes to the neighbouring countries and regions, 
November 2005.  
28 European Commission, COM(2006)726, op. cit.  
29 The first of these agreements are expected to be with Morocco, Russia, Algeria, Ukraine, Belarus and 
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heavily criticised by NGO activists and neighbourhood countries themselves, the latter often not 
having the facilities or resources to enforce these agreements under conditions that respect basic 
human rights. For example the Moroccan authorities have been reported dumping refugees in 
the desert, and Ukraine is said to have deported Chechen refugees to Russia from where they 
fled.
30 
Visa facilitation with ENP states is absolutely necessary. Otherwise the reputation of the ENP is 
gravely damaged. The efficiency of the consular services of some member states needs serious 
improvement. The costs of implementing readmission agreements needs in some cases at least to 
be shared by the EU. The prospect of visa-free travel should be held out for the most advanced 
partner states (as already is the case with Israel).   
Point 10. Association with foreign and security policy 
In order to extend the reach of its common foreign policy, the EU has been some inviting 
neighbouring states to formally associate themselves with its foreign and security policy 
‘declarations’. Moldova and Ukraine have had the possibility to associate themselves with 
CFSP statements since mid-2005. The ENP Action Plans with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
published at the end of 2006 also envisage that the EU may invite these countries to align 
themselves on case-by-case basis with the EU’s positions on regional and international issues. 
The Commission has also proposed to extend this possibility to Southern neighbours. 
Moldova and Ukraine’s record in subscribing to CFSP statements has been quite positive. Both 
countries have subscribed to almost all EU declarations on international issues and have 
supported EU positions in international organisations, such as the UN, the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe. Out of 148 EU CFSP statements issued by the EU in 2006, Moldova did not 
subscribe to seven and Ukraine to eight. The bulk of alignments with CFSP statements 
happened on issues that are of little relevance for Moldova and Ukraine. The record is less 
straightforward when it comes to EU positions on post-Soviet states. Ukraine has a record of not 
aligning itself with some CFSP statements on Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. 
Moldova has a record of not aligning its position with that of the EU in some cases on Belarus, 
Russia and Azerbaijan. Such variations are explained by the political and economic relations 
these countries have with other post-Soviet states, for example Ukraine’s efforts to diversify its 
gas suppliers away from Russia, and Moldova’s relatively significant trade with Belarus.  
The EU should seek better ways not only to communicate but also to cooperate with its 
neighbours on foreign policy. The EU needs to look for better ways to seek alignment of its 
neighbours not only on declarations but also actions. The EU could make more issue linkages 
and provide better incentives for the neighbouring states to align on actions that are more than 
symbolic. There have been some examples of ENP states contributing to ESDP missions (see 
point 11). 
The mechanism of associating certain ENP states with EU foreign policy declarations is a 
worthwhile process in the course of development. It could be enriched by linking more 
declarations with actions.  
Point 11. Crisis management 
The EU is fast building up its crisis management capabilities, and has acquired experience with 
16 ESDP missions so far. However its engagement in the unresolved conflicts of the ENP area 
has been quite limited so far.   
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Moldova has emerged as a priority. The EU’s Special Representative for Moldova participates 
in the 5+2 negotiation mechanism for seeking a solution to the Transnistria problem. The EU 
has sanctioned Transnistria’s leadership with a visa ban, and deployed a Border Assistance 
Mission to curb smuggling and improve border management on the Transnistrian entity’s 
borders with Ukraine and right-bank Moldova.   
In the South Caucasus the EU also has a Special Representative, but responsibilities for the 
conflicts there are diffused. For Abkhazia there are British, French and German representatives 
in the UN-sponsored procedures, and for Nagorno Karabakh, France is represented in the 
OSCE-sponsored Minsk group. The EU presence is thus rather confusing. In 2006 the EU 
became the biggest international donor to both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but declined the 
invitation to take over from an OSCE mission monitoring the border with Russia. Instead the 
EU focused on Georgia’s reform efforts, deploying in 2004-05 a ‘rule of law’ mission to 
Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS). The EU has little if any policy over Nagorno Karabakh, deferring 
to the Minsk group.  
The EU’s involvement in the Middle East peace process has been long and substantial. The EU 
is clearly identified with core proposals for the two-state solution with pre-1967 borders. The 
EU’s High Representative, Javier Solana, and his successive Special Representatives in the 
region have been active and visible, while the Commission’s aid programme to the Palestinian 
Authority has been substantial. The EU has followed the line that working towards a solution 
requires unity in the Quartet, meaning agreement with the US. With the ambivalent US position, 
swinging between Clinton’s activism and Bush’s relative withdrawal and underlying Israeli 
bias, the EU’s efforts have been blocked. The current ESDP mission monitoring the Rafah 
border crossing between Gaza and Egypt shows a willingness of the EU to gradually increase its 
operational engagement.  
The Western Sahara dispute in the Maghreb is another omission on the EU’s foreign policy 
agenda. The unresolved problem, which started with Morocco’s annexation in 1975 of the 
former Spanish colony, has been the main source of division between neighbouring Algeria and 
Morocco. The EU has no common position or involvement here.  
The ENP’s comprehensive approach can and should embrace crisis management operations. 
While the EU’s experience with ESDP missions is increasing rapidly, the record in the ENP 
area is mixed so far. Some simple organisational measures remain to be taken, such as unifying 
the EU representation in relations to the South Caucasus conflicts.   
Point 12. ‘ENP light’ for difficult partner states and entities 
Among the Eastern neighbours there is the special case of Belarus. The new member states want 
a more pro-active policy towards Belarus, and this has resulted in the ‘non-paper’ by the 
Commission already referred to (section 3). This leads towards a new policy concept over how 
to deal with an authoritarian regime that routinely abuses human rights: a combination of 
‘people’ programmes and media actions, with some sanctions including a travel ban and 
freezing of assets for the leaders of the regime. To the South, Syria participates in the Barcelona 
meetings, albeit without ratification of its Association Agreement, and receives aid under 
Meda/ENPI. Libya could presumably enter actively into the Barcelona and ENP processes as 
and when the Bulgarian nurses are released, having renounced its weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) programme. 
So far the ENP has lacked much creative thinking about how the non-recognised secessionist 
entities (Abkhazia, South-Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh and Transnistria) might be drawn into at 
least some ENP activity.  None of them can be fully included in the ENP, but they could benefit 
from inclusion in ENP projects in such areas as education, culture, civil society building, health 
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environment, regional cooperation, people-to-people contacts and fighting human trafficking. 
The most recent Georgian and Abkhaz peace plans speak about the desire and readiness to 
include Abkhazia into the ENP. Transnistrian businesses are interested in trade with the EU, and 
Transnistria’s business-friendly parliament or chamber of commerce could be some of the 
channels through which ENP standards are extended to Transnistria. The EU should build on 
this common ground to extend parts of the ENP Action Plans to the secessionist entities. The 
idea of involving the secessionist entities in ‘Euro-regions’ with neighbouring regions could be 
explored. For example a Krasnodar krai (Russia) – Abkhazia-Mingrelia (Western Georgia) 
Euro-region, or Odessa (Ukraine) – Transnistria-Chisinau (Moldova) Euro-region could be 
explored. Such measures would serve the conflict resolution processes, as both the legitimate 
states of Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, as well as the de facto states of Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh and Transnistria could start moving into the same direction – 
towards European standards and norms. Some of these entities are becoming partially 
democratic, notably Abkhazia, and are open to Europeanising influences. The EU has begun to 
take some initiatives, for example a sizeable mission from the Commission went to Abkhazia in 
early 2007 to explore possibilities.  
Engagement by the EU in the Western Sahara should concern conflict resolution at the 
multilateral level and ‘people’ programmes with the Sahrawi people.    
For these politically ‘difficult’ neighbours, there is growing awareness of the case for limited 
cooperation at the level of ‘people’ programmes, as part of a more diversified set of ENP 
instruments or packages, including in some cases limited sanctions.   
Point 13. The Black Sea and beyond 
The Commission will present a new Black Sea policy during the first half of 2007. According to 
its December 2006 document, the forthcoming ‘Black Sea Synergy’ will emphasise transport, 
energy and environment.
31 The Commission has now also mentioned the possibility of accepting 
observer status in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSEC) – an idea that is 
10 years old. At the institutional level, the proposal for the EU to take up observer status within 
the BSEC is a positive move. The European Parliament might also send observers to the Black 
Sea Parliamentary Assembly. Given BSEC’s modest performance so far, the EU should surely 
not rely exclusively on it for Black Sea regional initiatives. Variable geometry for the Black Sea 
region seems appropriate.  
The Commission’s December document surprisingly makes no reference to democracy 
promotion, given efforts in the last year by Georgia and Ukraine leading to the Community of 
Democratic Choice (CDC). This initiative could benefit from EU support. 
The Commission proposes political dialogue between the EU and Eastern ENP states, with 
foreign minister meetings back-to-back with meetings at ministerial level of BSEC. An 
alternative would be to follow up on the ‘Black Sea Forum’ initiative of Romania in June 2006, 
which saw the convening of a political summit. Other Black Sea states could play host to an 
annual event of this type to give political direction to Black Sea affairs.  
The EU’s opening of a Black Sea initiative could also lead to an opening towards cooperation 
with Russia in the region. Up until now Russia has not been in favour of any external third-party 
presence in Black Sea affairs, be it the US, NATO or the EU, but the EU is no longer an 
external third party, but a legitimate Black Sea actor.  
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Beyond the littoral states of the Black Sea, the Commission is also opening up a ‘neighbours of 
our neighbours’ concept, which links with a Central Asian initiative which the German 
Presidency is keen to advance. Looking at the specifics of the five countries of the region, 
however, it is not too difficult to discern the EU’s priorities.
32 Summarised in one word, the 
priority should be Kazakhstan, for multiple reasons: its size and geographic proximity, its 
energy resources, the interest of its elite in ‘Europe’ (as manifested in its bid for OSCE 
chairmanship, and its expression of interest in the Council of Europe and the ENP). The overall 
strategy should therefore be targeted by country and topic, and avoid a thin, uniform, wide-
ranging approach such as in the ineffective, first generation of Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements in this region.  
The time for the EU to add a Black Sea dimension to the ENP has obviously arrived. This 
should adopt a variable geometry approach, cooperating with the BSEC organisation but not 
exclusively.  
Point 14. Budget resources 
The EU has committed substantial financial resources to the ENP. Its new European 
Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) is endowed with €11.2 billion of budgetary 
grants for the 2007-13 financial framework period. This is 32% more that the €8.5 billion 
allocated in the previous 2000-06 period, which was divided between the ENPI’s two 
predecessor instruments, Tacis and Meda.  
The ENPI authorises more diversified types of intervention than especially Tacis allowed in the 
past, including investment funding and direct budgetary support, thus extending some of the 
features of the more diversified Meda. This will allow in particular a move away from excessive 
concentration on technical assistance programmes which have proved so difficult to implement 
effectively. Given the institutional hindrances to getting an administratively simpler financial 
regulation, there has surely to be a switching of priorities in favour of programmes that are by 
their nature less vulnerable to these constraints. 
Education is a prime candidate for increased financial allocations. Up until now programmes 
such as Tempus and even the new Erasmus Mundus have been on a small scale. Within the EU 
itself, the Commission has been able to build up the massive Erasmus programme, with 100,000 
higher educational exchanges per year, with large member states seeing 10,000-15,000 students 
enrolled per year. By contrast the Erasmus Mundus programme, catering for all of the rest of the 
world, has offered Ukraine only 20 places per year, i.e. a token gesture rather than a strategic 
contribution. Moreover on closer inspection, this Erasmus Mundus turns out to be weak in the 
social sciences, which are particularly relevant for transition economies of the neighbourhood 
(political science, international relations, economics and European studies). It is therefore highly 
welcome that the Commission is now proposing a large-scale Scholarship Programme 
exclusively for the ENP, with an endowment of €209 million for the period 2007-10, which 
aims at enrolling 1,000 students per year by 2009.
33 This is beginning to get serious. Yet for 
Russia and Ukraine alone, one might aim at fostering about 1,500 students per year, in order to 
get really into the building of new elites with modern, European and cosmopolitan outlooks, 
with a total for the ENP as a whole of 3,000. This is especially pertinent for Russia, where the 
new middle class favours educational opportunities in Europe for their children, even while the 
present leadership tries to shut out external political influences (viz. the new law on NGOs). 
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The ENPI includes a new ‘Governance Facility’ with an allocation of €300 million, which has 
been the subject of lively debate in the EU institutions. This facility will reward best-performing 
partner states with additional funding, the idea being to enhance the conditional incentives on 
offer from the ENP. As it turns out, this initiative will only be a minor incentive, but the 
Neighbourhood Investment Fund will be more substantial (see next point). 
The new ENPI is an improvement over its predecessor instruments, Tacis and Meda, allowing a 
more complete range of interventions. This is especially useful for the Eastern neighbours, 
given the very narrow possibilities under the previous Tacis programme that led to a lot of 
wasteful technical assistance.   
Point 15. Investment and coordination with the IFIs 
The Neighbourhood Investment Fund (NIF), as a sub-programme of the ENPI with an allocation 
of €700 million, will provide grant money to leverage lending and investment resources from 
the international financial institutions (IFIs), especially the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). For the Eastern 
neighbours this is a new departure, since there was no facility of this type for this region before, 
but in the South it will co-exist initially at least with FEMIP (Facility for Euro-Mediterranean 
Investment and Partnership), which gives the EIB access to Commission budgetary resources.  
The EIB is planning to lend amounts comparable to the ENPI’s grants, with €12.4 billion 
allocated for 2007-13, of which €3.7 billion is allocated to the Eastern neighbours and €8.7 to 
the Southern neighbours. These lending and investment operations are on a fast-rising trend, 
especially for the East where the EIB was only recently mandated to start operations.  
The EBRD has successfully established a considerable niche in Central and Eastern Europe, 
with emphasis on private investment linked to project-related policy issues (e.g. corporate 
governance, or sectoral policies linked to energy and transport projects). Given the lesser needs 
now for its operations in the new member states, the EBRD might usefully be restructured 
towards serving both the East and the South. Also the FEMIP could be subsumed into the NIF 
after the latter has become established.  
The link of the NIF to the IFIs highlights major issues of coordination between the Commission 
and these lending/investing agencies. There is ongoing dialogue between these institutions on 
how best to coordinate and achieve synergies in their policies of conditionality. The practices of 
the EIB, EBRD and World Bank differ significantly. The EIB focuses mostly on the financial 
bankability of projects, whereas the World Bank and the EBRD also address sectoral policy 
issues surrounding their projects. There has been some coordination of policy-shaping between 
the Commission and World Bank, with the Commission drawing on World Bank policy 
analytical work in the preparation of Action Plans, and the World Bank referring to the content 
of these Action Plans in its sectoral programming documents (e.g. in the case of Ukraine).   
There remains a strategic prize for the Commission and IFIs to aim at together, which would be 
to form operational alliances, such that their combined leverage would translate into a strong 
policy-shaping and conditionality mechanism. From the EU standpoint, the weakness of the 
ENP is that it cannot offer the membership incentive conditional upon policy performance. On 
the other hand, the Commission, EU member states and IFIs could view their joining of forces 
as an alternative route to reinforcing policy conditionality. There could be further coordination 
with the US in view of its conditional aid mechanisms, such as the Millennium Fund. 
The Commission plus the IFIs (EIB, EBRD, World Bank) have together huge financial 
resources and policy analytical capabilities. If well coordinated, they can generate big 
synergies in conditioning and stimulating reform along the lines of the Action Plans of the ENP. 
There are established procedures of dialogue, but there is room for raising the level of ambition 
for co-financing and coordinated conditionality. 24 | 
Annex 
Perceptions of the ENP Partner States 
Eastern Partners 
Ukraine – willing 
Ukraine is the most vocal state in the neighbourhood proclaiming its desire to join the EU. The 
Post-Orange revolution developments have only strengthened this ambition. Ukraine’s 
democratic progress has been rather good, although its achievements have not yet been 
consolidated. Ukraine’s greatest progress was in ensuring freedom of the media, free and fair 
elections and Europeanising its foreign policy on the separatist conflict in Transnistria. Its 
biggest problems stemmed from an incapacity to mobilise a stable domestic majority supporting 
economic reforms. As a result Ukraine has still not been able to join the WTO and EU-Ukraine 
trade relations have advanced less quickly than they could. Still, Ukraine remains the EU’s 
leading partner in the Eastern neighbourhood, and negotiations have already begun on an 
‘enhanced agreement’, which should cover deep free trade, visa facilitation, energy dialogue, 
cooperation in justice and home affairs and links to the CFSP.   
Moldova – willing  
Moldova has the ambition to join the European Union in the long run, and has already 
positioned itself as a Southeast European state. The government aims at a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement, or an Association Agreement with the EU in 2008. While Moldova is 
enthusiastic about joining the EU, it is less enthusiastic about the ENP, which does not offer 
Moldova a European perspective. Still, Moldova has made the implementation of the ENP 
Action Plan a central element of its reform process. Despite some progress on economic 
reforms, border management and EU-inspired legislative changes, Moldova’s democratic 
reforms have slowed down in recent years. Moldova has failed to make significant progress on 
independence of the judiciary, the fight against corruption and respect of media freedom. 
Moldova’s European ambitions have been high, while implementation of reforms has 
significantly lagged behind.  
Georgia – willing 
The authorities in Tbilisi aim at full integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures (i.e. NATO and 
the EU) as part of its Westernisation strategy, thus seeking real independence from Russia. The 
‘Rose Revolution’ triggered the inclusion of the three South Caucasus countries into the ENP, 
and Georgia has been gathering wide support for reforms and recognition as one of the regional 
front-runners. Nonetheless difficulties appear in legislative harmonisation, reform of the 
judiciary, local self-government, the development of multi-party structures and independence of 
the media. Georgia wanted the ENP Action Plan to give priority to conflict resolution, border 
assistance and free trade with the EU, and was disappointed not to achieve bigger results on 
these accounts.  
Armenia – willing 
Armenia has stated its European vocation, and engagement into the ENP is seen as a way to 
escape regional isolation and promote economic development. Armenian commitment to the 
ENP is two-fold: at a declaratory level closer relations with the EU are recognised as Armenia’s 
final goal; on a more pragmatic note, reforms included in the ENP and previously stated in the 
PCA, seem to advance only in the economic field. Reforms in the political, social and judicial 
areas have made little progress. Armenia’s foreign policy is based on the principle of 
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Yerevan’s most important international partner. The ongoing Nagorno Karabakh conflict with 
Azerbaijan is still seen as the main obstacle for regional relations to develop, but the EU has 
been reluctant to make conflict resolution a central part of the ENP Action Plan. 
Azerbaijan – passive 
Azerbaijan has been the most reluctant of the South Caucasus countries in approaching 
European integration, mostly because of its strategic location and energy reserves, which allows 
Baku a wider set of options and added leverage in regional and global cooperation. Azerbaijan 
has reluctantly pursued domestic reforms in political, social, judicial and even economic terms, 
as envisaged in the ENP Action Plan. While the EU is keen to seek closer energy relations with 
Azerbaijan, its concern for greater democratisation and respect for human rights has been low 
key. Azeri civil society is generally more willing to engage with Europe and its values, but the 
government has not been open to a triangular dialogue with them and the EU over the Action 
Plan. 
Russia – reluctant 
Russia has refused to be part of the ENP, though the EU is Russia’s most important economic 
and political partner. Russia’s reticence on ENP has its roots in Russia’s view of itself as a self-
sufficient second pole of influence and attraction in Europe. Thus in Russia’s perception, it is 
not the ‘EU’s neighbour’, but rather the EU and Russia are each other’s neighbours. Russia 
wants to base its relationship with the EU on equality, partnership and non-interference in 
internal affairs. The EU-Russian relationship has become increasingly ambiguous, with Russia’s 
growing authoritarian consolidation and desire to solidify its influence in countries located 
where it perceives to be its European sphere of influence. In addition Russia’s economic 
protectionism is likely to be a complicating factor in relations with the EU.  
Belarus – excluded 
Belarus is the only Eastern neighbouring country without an agreement with the EU, and 
virtually no framework for dialogue. It is not formally part of the ENP. Due to an authoritarian 
regime which routinely abuses human rights, Belarus is the only neighbouring country under 
some sanctions from the EU – a travel ban and frozen assets for the leaders of the regime. The 
effects of Belarus’ economic and political isolation from Europe have been attenuated by a close 
alliance with Russia. However, recent tensions between Belarus and Russia, made the former 
seek some apparent rapprochement with the EU. Belarus officials state that they would like to 
become part of the ENP. 
Secessionist entities – excluded  
The secessionist entities of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh and Transnistria are 
formally part of the ENP states of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, respectively. However, 
there has been no effective ENP in these disputed regions. Still their views of the ENP differ. 
Abkhazia, which is trying to diversify its excessive dependence on Russia, is the most open to 
the EU and is willing to engage deeper with the ENP. Georgia is likely to accept to a certain 
extent such a development. South Ossetia remains cautious on the ENP, and pursues a policy of 
de facto integration into Russia. Transnistria’s authoritarian leadership, which is named in an 
EU travel ban, is tacitly opposed to a greater EU role in the conflict settlement efforts. However, 
parts of the Transnistrian significant business community would benefit from and are supportive 
of greater openness to the EU, which is one of Transnistria’s main trading partners. Nagorno 
Karabakh perceives the ENP through its close association with Armenia, although Azerbaijan is 
openly against any kind of efforts to connect Nagorno Karabakh to ENP activities and projects.  26 | EMERSON, NOUTCHEVA & POPESCU 
 
Southern Partners 
Morocco – willing 
Morocco’s rejected application for EC membership in 1987 has never diluted its ambition for an 
‘advanced’ relationship with the EU. Its enthusiastic engagement with the ENP and relatively 
early adoption of an Action Plan are indicative of Morocco’s aspiration to anchor its reform 
process to deep cooperation and integration with the EU. The country’s solid record in the 
implementation of economic modernisation and reform policies is testimony to the Moroccan 
government’s willingness to draw maximum benefit from the ENP. However, political and 
social reforms are being introduced at a much slower pace. Despite praise for the Monarch’s 
‘national reconciliation’ project, fundamental measures aimed at reforming the monarchy and 
decentralising government structures have attracted criticism of the regime’s true willingness to 
introduce change. Furthermore, modernisation of the judiciary and respect of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights leave a lot to be desired.  
Tunisia – willing 
Tunisia’s strategic choice in building close ties with Europe since the late 1960s is led by its 
economic structures and interests, namely the primacy of agriculture and services (primarily 
tourism) as the main sources of revenue and employment. Tunisia has anchored its priorities on 
deeper ties with the EU. In this context, the ENP represents a natural development in EU-
Tunisian relations, aimed at meeting their aspirations for deeper integration and dialogue. The 
resulting solid record of Tunisia in economic reform and modernisation is in sharp contrast, 
however, with the social and political spheres. Social inequalities are rife and the leadership 
displays undemocratic behaviour on a regular basis towards the opposition, particularly if the 
latter is of Islamist provenance. A recently-foiled terrorist plot (January 2007) has led to 
arbitrary detentions and arrests reflecting deeply entrenched practices and abuses.  
Palestinian Territories – willing 
The EU has been heavily engaged in the Palestinian Territories since the beginning of the Oslo 
peace process, becoming the largest Western donor of financial aid, which especially since the 
beginning of the Road Map has been subject to political conditionality. The Palestinians have 
seen the EU as a more even-handed partner than the US, and at times the only provider of vital 
aid, such as for funding the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority was thus a willing 
partner in drawing up an Action Plan, with much of its policy reform content already worked 
out under the Road Map process. In brief the EU has been a lifeline, and the prospect of 
strengthening this under the ENP was readily welcomed. However the EU’s credibility as 
promoter of democracy has been seriously damaged for many Palestinians because of its refusal 
to embrace the Hamas party following its electoral success in 2006. Its aid programme has been 
largely interrupted, and the Action plan effectively frozen. The credibility of the Palestinian 
Authority as partner has been prejudiced by violent conflict between Hamas and Fatah activists 
in early 2007.   
Israel – willing 
By virtue of its historical European roots, its advanced economy and shared democratic values, 
Israel has been favourably disposed towards the general idea of a deeper relationship with the 
EU. These inclinations are reinforced by Israel’s virtual isolation in the Arab Middle East, and 
uneasiness with the Barcelona process because of its multilateral and ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
character. The bilateral dimension to the ENP is thus especially welcome for Israel. Israel EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY TWO YEARS ON: TIME INDEED FOR AN ‘ENP PLUS’ | 27 
 
negotiated very actively to tailor the Action Plan to its interests. In principle Israel would like to 
use the Action Plan process as a way to further develop operational links of an institutional and 
programmatic nature (e.g. through participation in EU agencies, programmes and policies). 
There is an active debate within Israel over different conceivable scenarios for a deepened 
relationship with the EU. Something approaching the European Economic Area model is 
viewed as feasible in view of the economy’s sophistication. Even membership is advocated by a 
small minority in the Knesset, but this is more a sentiment than a plausible scenario. 
Jordan – willing 
Jordan’s early engagement in the ENP does not reflect a close political affinity with Europe. As 
with its previous cooperation and association agreements with the EC/EU, the Jordanian Action 
Plan is considered more as a framework for trade and economic reform than a tool for deep 
political cooperation. Jordan is a cooperative political partner for the EU, and the King 
manifests European inclinations. However the US is its predominant international partner. There 
is a solid record of economic reforms, as reflected in membership of the WTO and free trade 
agreements with the US, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. Politically, the government’s human 
rights practices, particularly towards political Islamist opposition and a large community of 
displaced Palestinians, are subjects of international criticism. 
Lebanon – passive 
Lebanon is open to European influences and is keen on developing closer ties with the EU. The 
Lebanese government was one of the fastest to agree an EU-proposed Action Plan, but security 
challenges currently prevent it from developing closer economic and political cooperation with 
the EU. The conflict with Israel in the summer of 2006 and the ensuing internal tensions 
between various factions of the society shifted its attention inward to securing stability and 
stalled the final approval of the ENP Action Plan. For Lebanon, the Action Plan confers 
legitimacy on its domestic reform plans which it desperately needs in order to show credibility 
vis-à-vis its creditors. The Lebanese public debt problem dates back to the 1990s when the 
economy was booming on reconstruction activity after 15 years of civil war. Given the fragility 
of its government and its weak state institutions, it remains to be seen to what extent Lebanon 
can engage fully in a reform process leading to greater convergence with the EU model of 
governance.  
Egypt – passive 
Egypt plays a pivotal role in the region. The size of its population and the importance of its 
influence on regional political developments, particularly in relation to the Middle East conflict, 
have made it a highly sensitive case for Western initiatives in the region. For Egypt, relations 
with the EU are a priority for economic and political reasons. Egyptian engagement in the ENP 
was initially tentative for fears of diluting the multilateral quality of the Barcelona process, and 
its potential for promoting peace and stability in the region. Moreover the idea of political 
conditionality within the ENP was not appreciated by Egypt. However economic liberalisation 
is well under way and the recently agreed Action Plan is seen as a tool to consolidate Egypt’s 
efforts in that direction. Political reforms however remain very slow. 
Algeria – reluctant 
Algeria’s rejection of the ENP, as opposed to its cooperative attitude towards the Barcelona 
process, mirrors the fluctuating tendencies that have marked the country’s relations with the EU. 
The ENP, for Algeria, represents ‘dictation’ rather than ‘partnership’ and, as such, is deemed 
‘not a priority for now’. The stipulations of the Association Agreement with the EU regarding 28 | EMERSON, NOUTCHEVA & POPESCU 
 
political and socio-economic reforms are being implemented only very slowly. The process of 
privatisation initiated a decade ago and the modernisation of the banking and financial sectors 
are at a standstill. The only notable economic progress lies in the considerable amount of state 
investment in infrastructure, but diversification of the economy remains a challenge. 
Furthermore, the presidential ‘national reconciliation charter’ has been criticised by human 
rights groups accusing it of lenience towards the role of security forces during the crisis of the 
1990s. Algeria insists on ‘home-grown’ reform (political and economic) and strongly resents 
anything resembling external interference.  
Syria – excluded 
The successful conclusion of the negotiations of the Association Agreement between Syria and 
the EU in October 2004 has not led to its formal ratification and entry into force. The dramatic 
developments following the Hariri assassination in February 2005 have stalled the process and 
further isolated Syria from the international community. This has meant that Syria’s 
participation in the ENP cannot be operational beyond some help from the ENPI. The reforms 
hoped for by many since the advent to power of Bashar Al-Assad in 2000 have not materialised. 
Oppression of any form of political opposition and civil society activities are a common feature 
of the Syrian political scene. The liberalisation of a highly-centralised economy has failed to 
happen and has not been encouraged by its lucrative hydrocarbon sector.    
Libya – excluded 
The year 2003 marked a qualitative turning point in Libya’s relations with the EU. The 
successful resolutions of the Lockerbie and WMD standoffs followed by the lifting of UN 
sanctions saw the beginnings of a rapprochement with the EU. Libya expressed its keenness to 
participate in EU initiatives such as the ENP, which found positive resonance in European 
circles. However, controversy surrounding the role of Bulgarian nurses in a Benghazi hospital 
drama has halted the normalisation of relations between the EU and Libya. Moreover, recent 
(January 2007) declarations by Kadhafi’s son regarding the faith of the convicted nurses 
coincided with mounting questions surrounding the Colonel’s true intentions for reform and 
suspected preference for ‘familial transition’. Libya’s reform process remains uncharted and the 
West’s unconditional appetite for its oil and gas reserves will not help much in this regard.   
Western Sahara – excluded. 
This is now a divided territory, with its Western and coastal part occupied by Morocco, and the 
Eastern part which is largely empty desert controlled by the Polisario Front. Morocco has 
constructed a fortified wall or barrier along this de facto border. Morocco offers autonomy 
within the Moroccan state, but this is contested by much of the Sahrawi population and the 
Polisario based in Algeria. The EU has taken no position on this frozen conflict, which remains 
the major obstacle to improved Maghreb regional relations, and impedes any functioning of the 
Maghreb-Arab Union. There is no awareness of the ENP among the leaders of the Sahrawi 
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